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HE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the world's largest civil
engineering firm. 1 Not only does the Corps design, dig, and
build dams, channels, and jetties, it also has broad regulatory
powers. Since 1890, parties desiring to construct or excavate in
navigable waterways have been required to obtain the Corps' prior
permission. 2
In 1975, the Corps was given additional regulatory responsibilities when a court ordered the Corps to expand its program to require anyone affecting the water of the United States by either
dredging or filling to obtain a permit.3 The resulting expansion of
regulation has thrust familiar actors into unfamiliar roles. Developers and farmers, the Corps' traditional allies, have adamantly
opposed expansion of the Corps' jurisdiction. In contrast, environmental groups, accustomed to attacking the Corps as an environmental despoiler, have supported the increase in its powers.4 The

T

Moser, Dig they must, the Army Engineers, securing allies and acquiring enemies,
SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1976, at 43.
2 See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, ch. 907, § 7, 26 Stat. 426, 454 (1890) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 407 (1970) ).
3 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975);
see text accompanying note 79 infra. For a description of the Corps' Administrative Pro•
gram, see 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.110-.410 (1976).
4 See Section 404 of Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
1
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Corps itself, as always, has remained in the midst of the fray, enduring the same amount of heat, albeit from a new direction.
Sensitive to accusations that it has usurped too much congressional
power,5 the Corps initially attempted to shirk its new responsibilities. The 94th Congress was unable to decide how expansive the
Corps' powers should be, and the 95th Congress is now considering
the same question.
The program administered by the Corps has evolved dramatically in recent years: jurisdiction has expanded considerably;
decision criteria and procedures have become more complex;
decisions are more likely to be challenged in the courts; and, most
importantly, the role of the Corps ha,s changed from that of a benevolent and permissive overseer of private activities to that of a defender of the environment. The purpose of this article is to provide
a comprehensive examination of this evolution. Part I reviews the
history of the enabling legislation that originally swept coastal
development within the oversight authority of the Corps. Part II
reviews the evolution of the Corps' regulatory program, and Part
III appraises the program's efficacy. Although this discussion may
address tangentially whether the Corps' jurisdiction should be
expanded, my hope is that the article will suggest what the proper
role of the Corps should be in light of both its abilities and its
limitations. Because federal, state, and local legislatures increasingly refer each new conflict concerning land use to administrative
agencies with directions that such conflicts be resolved in the
"public interest," 6 the Corps' almost ninety years of experience
may provide lessons as to the strengths and weaknesses of such
"public interest" regulations.
l.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS AcT

Congress created the Army Corps of Engineers in 1802.7 Among
its original duties were the placement and construction of certain
5 The Corps has long been damned by critics. See generally J. LENNEY, CASTE SYSTEM IN
THE AMERICAN ARMY: A STUDY OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THEIR WEST POINT SYSTEM
(1949); A. MAASS, MUDDY WATER (1951); A. MORGAN, DAMS AND OTHER DISASTERS (1971).
6 Cf. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 54-55 (1974) (current trend in land
use regulation toward a case-by-case review to ensure adequate sensitivity to community
and environmental impact).
7 Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 26, 2 Stat. 132, 137.
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frontier defense structures previously authorized and funded by
Congress. 8 During the War of 1812, the Corps expanded, assumi~g
authority to inspect coastal fortifications at "various important
Ports and Harbours between Maine and New Orleans." 9
Congress continued to authorize the Corps to make improvements in rivers and harbors throughout the nineteenth century,
but the purpose of such improvements changed from fortification
to promotion of navigation. For example, in 1824, Congress authorized the Corps to deepen the channel to the harbor of Presque
Isle (Lake Erie) and to restore Plymouth Harbor.10 The Corps
engaged in such projects until the 1860's, when the Civil War
diverted its attention. Thereafter, Congress began appropriating
funds annually for the improvement of rivers and harbors, and
the Corps returned to civil engineering. These appropriations were
the largest federal construction expenditures in that era and were
awarded by Congress on a "pork barrel" basis.11
In 1877, the Chief of Engineers initiated a proposal that ultimately led to a significant expansion of the responsibility of the
Corps.12 The proposal was designed especially to protect harbor
areas from the congestion caused by random unplanned construction of wharves and piers. This legislation, known as the
"Dolph Bill," was introduced in Congress several times over the
next decade without success. Then, in 1888, the United States
Supreme Court decided Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch. 18
The Court held that, in the absence of a statutory enactment by
Congress, state legislatures were free to authorize or prohibit the
construction of bridges, dams, and other structures in or over
waters within the state, regardless of whether such structures
obstructed navigation. 14
The Hatch decision spurred the enactment of the Dolph Bill.
Proponents finally obtained ·passage by appending the proposed
grant of regulatory powers to the annual rivers and harbors apSee, e.g., Act of May IO, 1800, ch. 48, § 1, 2 Stat. 66, 67.
9 F. HILL, Ro.ws, RAILS AND WATERWAYS 6 (1957) (quoting miscellaneous letters of Engi•
neer Dep't).
JO Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 153, 4 Stat. 38, 39.
11 See generally Moser, supra note 1, at 43.
12 See S. REP. No. 224, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1888).
13 125 U.S. l (1888).
14 Id. at 8-13.
8
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propriations bill, which was to become known as the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1890.15 In its final form, the Act established two
distinct regulatory procedures. Section 6 outlawed depositing
refuse into navigable waters in the absence of permission from the
Secretary of War.16 Section 7 not only reversed Hatch by requiring
the approval of the Secretary of War for construction of all bridges
over navigable waters, but also required such approval for all
construction activities in navigable waters.17
In 1896, Congress directed the Secretary of War to compile all
general laws relating to navigable waters and to propose such
"revision, emendation, or enlargement" as he thought advantageous "to the public interest." 18 The Secretary delegated this task
to the Chief of Engineers, who responded with a draft of what
became the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.19
This act, although represented to Congress as merely a compilation of existing law,20 effected some significap.t substantive changes. ·
Section 9 outlawed construction of bridges, dams, or causeways in
the absence of congressional c9nsent, thereby substituting Congress
for the Secretary of War as the licensing authority. Apparently,
the change was responsive to an 1891 lower federal court decision
that had indicated that Congress could not constitutionally delegate its authority to approve the construction of bridges.21 Under
section 10, however, the Secretary of War retained the authority
to license dredging, filling, and construction activities in navigable
waters. Similarly, section 13 continued the prohibition against
discharges of refuse in waters in the absence of a permit from the
Secretary of War. These three key sections of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 have remained in effect since their enactment,22
15
16
11

18
10

20
21
22

Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426.
Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
Act of June 3, 1896, ch. 314, § 2, 29 Stat. 202, 234.
Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121.
See 32 CoNG. REc. 2296 (1899).
See United States v. Koekuk & H. Bridge Co., 45 F. 178, 183-84 (S.D. Iowa 1891).
The sections, codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401, 403, & 407 (1970), provide:
§ 401. Construction of bridges, causeways, dams or dikes generally
It shall not be lawful to contruct or commence the construction of any bridge,
dam, dike, or causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navi•
gable river, or other navigable water of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained and until the plans
for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers
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subject only to minor changes in language made necessary by
governmental reorganization (changing the title "Secretary of
and by the Secretary of the Army: Provided, That such structures may be built
under authority of the legislature of a State across rivers and other watenvays the
navigable portions of which lie wholly within the limits of a single State, provided
the location and plans thereof are submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engi•
neers and by the Secretary of the Army before construction is commenced: And provided further, That when plans for any bridge or other structure have been
approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army, it shall
not be lawful to deviate from such plans either before or after completion of the
structure unless the modification of said plans has previously been submitted to
and received the approval of the Chief of Engineers and of the Secretary of the
Army.
§ 403. Obstruction of navigable waters generally; wharves; piers, etc.; excavations
and filling in
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin,
boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States,
outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established,
except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port,
roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within the limits
of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States,
unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized
by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
§ 407. Deposit of refuse in navigable waters generally
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure
to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other
floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or
mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than
that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it
shall not be lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material
of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of
any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed
into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods,
or othenvise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall extend to, apply to, or prohibit the operations
in connection with the improvement of navigable waters or construction of public
works, considered necessary and proper by the United States officers supervising such improvement or public work: And provided further, That the
Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any
material above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits to be defined and
under conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application is made to him prior
to depositing such material; and whenever any permit is so granted the conditions
thereof shall be strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be unlawful.

HeinOnline -- 63 Va. L. Rev.

508 1977

Corps of Engineers

1977]

509

War" to "Secretary of the Army") and by an interdepartmental
transfer of functions (shifting oversight of the location and clearances of bridges and causeways to the Secretary of Transportation).23
IL

THE REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE

u .s. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Although the text of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 has
remained generally unaltered, the regulatory program of the
Corps has changed significantly since passage of the statute.
Changes have resulted from administrative and judicial interpretation of the Act, as well as from enactment of other statutes.

A.

Jurisdiction

1.

The Rivers and Harbors Act
Many of the traditional limitations on the Corps' jurisdiction
under the Rivers and Harbors Act were self-imposed. Some related to subject matter and others to territory.
a.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Rivers and Harbors Act theoretically subjected a sweeping
range and number of activities to federal regulation. Section 9 of
the Act made unlawful the construction of any bridge, dam, dike,
or causeway over navigable waters without the consent of Congress
and the approval of the Secretary of the Army. 24 Section 10 prohibited the creation of any obstruction without the affirmative
authorization of Congress and made unlawful any excavations or
construction without the authorization of the Secretary of the
Army. Finally, section 13 prohibited the deposit of any refuse
material of any kind into any navigable waters. 25 This broad language created the potential for active and widespread supervision
by the Corps of all activities on navigable waters.
Rather than seizing this opportunity fully, however, the Corps
severely restricted the scope of its monitoring. In harbor areas,
District Engineers drew expansive "harbor lines" within which
landfills or construction were permitted without the authorization
23
24
25

Department of Transportation Act, § 6(g)(6)(A), 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)(6)(A) (1970).
But see text accompanying note 23 supra.
As noted above, all three sections remain in effect.
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seemingly required by section 10; the Corps tacitly agreed that in
non-harbor areas, section 10 permits were not necessary.26 Section
13 (the "Refuse Act") was used only occasionally to impose civil
or criminal responsibility on those who discharged waste matter
that impeded navigation. 27
Beginning in the late l 960's, increased public and legislative
concern with water quality and wetlands preservation resulted in
a series of events that has affected significantly both the nature
and scope of the Corps' regulatory program. The Corps had long
assumed that congressional approval under section 9 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act was necessary only for large projects (bridges,
dams, and dikes, for example) that would cause some dislocation of
established shipping patterns. Accordingly, the Corps itself licensed
marginal works, that is, works on the boundary between land and
water, under section 10.28 This procedure, however, was challenged
successfully in ·a federal district court in 1969. In Citizen's Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,' opponents of an expressway
bordering the Hudson River convinced the court that the specifications for the project included the building of "dikes" and "causeways" that required the consent of Congress under section 9.29 In
deciding that the Corps had breached its duty by failing to secure
the consent of Congress before issuing the permit, the court cited
a dictionary definition of dike as "[a]n embankment for controlling
or holding back the waters of the sea or a river/' 30 and thereby
found the proposed project within the ambit of section 9.
In Petterson v. Resor, the federal district court in Oregon reached a contrary result under a similar fact situation.31 The Petterson
26 See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How nm
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCOON AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. No.
917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. Harbor lines
separate navigable channels and harbor areas from water areas not essential to navigation.
Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing a Citadel Under Siege,
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 19, 24 (1973). See also note 123 infra and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., The President Coolidge, IOI F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939); The Pile Driver No. 2,
239 F. 489 (2d Cir. 1916).
28 See Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (D. Ore. 1971) (discussed at text accompanying notes 31-34 infra).
29 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S,D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
949 (1970).
30 302 F. Supp. at 1089 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
403 (1967)).
31 331 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Ore. 1971).
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court observed that: "To accept plaintiffs' contention that any
struc·ture within the dictionary definition of a dike requires Congressional consent is to ignore the language and purpose of the
legislation and its interpretation for almost 70 years." 32 Moreover,
the court believed that plaintiffs' interpretation of the relevant
language of section 9 would render "Section [I OJ meaningless because 'jetties,' 'breakwaters' and 'fills,' mentioned in Section [1 OJ,
all come within plaintiffs' dictionary definition of dikes." 33 The
court concluded that section 9 requires congressional approval
only for those dikes that obstruct navigation, and that the fills
authorized by the Corps in this case were not "dikes" within the
meaning of section 9. 34 Consequently, the fills fell under section
10, which does not require congressional consent. This difference
of opinion within the federal judiciary remains unresolved; no
amount of reflection on the ambiguous and overlapping language
of sections 9 and 10 affords a clear answer. But Citizens Committee
was the first disruption of the Corps' expectations. It was not to
be the last.
In 1970, the House Committee on Government Operations recommended various changes in the Corps' regulatory program.35
The Corps adopted some of these changes by amending its regulations, directing District Engineers, when considering a proposal to
dredge, fill, or do other work in navigable waters, to examine not
only the effects on navigation, but also a full range of economic,
social, and environmental factors. 36 Additionally, separate permits
were thereafter required for work within harbor lines.37
Another recommendation proved more difficult to implement.
In 1960, Justice Douglas observed in dictum in United States v.
Republic Steel Corp. that the term "refuse" was broad enough to
Id. at 1306.
Id.
34 Id.
35 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26.
36 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.I20(f) (1976); text accompanying notes 126-33 infra. A public
interest review criterion first appeared in the Corps' regulations on Dec. 18, 1968, when
the regulations were amended to make "[t]he decision as to whether a permit will be issued
... rest on an evaluation of all relevant factors, including ... the general public interest."
33 Fed. Reg. 18,670-71 (1968) (formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1969)). Initially,
the Corps retained a good deal .of in-house resistance to and skepticism of the propriety of
such a standard. Interview with ,vmiam Hedeman, Counsel for Regulatory Programs,
Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Army, Nov. 7, 1976.
37 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.150(b)(2) (1976).
32

33
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include industrial wastes. 38 Ten years later, the Committee "discovered" the Refuse Act (section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act) and advocated its use, through the permit program, as an
industrial pollution control law. 39 The Corps responded by announcing a permit program that would cover all navigable waters
and their tributaries and focus on major industrial pollution.40
This approach presented two problems: first, the Refuse Act was
somewhat inconsistent with the more modem Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA); 41 and, second, such an interpretation placed thousands of industries in violation of the law. 42
Later in 1970, to eliminate confusion, President Nixon adopted
Executive Order 11,574,43 which created the Refuse Act Permit
Program and provided a method both for harmonizing the Act
with the FWPCA and for protecti:o.g certain industries against
prosecution. 44
The Refuse Act Permit Program proved to be short-lived. Before
a significant number of permits were actually issued, a federal
district court in Kalur v. Resor read the language of section 13 of
the Act literally and held the Permit Program invalid insofar as it
purported to allow the issuance of permits to discharge refuse
matter into non-navigable waterways that eventually lead into
navigable waters. 45 The court concluded that this language allows
licensing of discharges into navigable waters but gives the Secretary of the Army (the Corps) no authority to permit discharges
into the tributaries of navigable waters. This decision, by interpreting the Refuse Act as an absolute prohibition of discharges
362 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1960).
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 14-18.
40 See J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAw SYSTEM 83 (1975).
41 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975). By establishing its own permit program and
thereby ignoring the activities of state pollution control agencies, the Federal Water
Quality Administration, and other interested bodies, the Corps would preclude any
harmony among various legislative programs and create administrative chaos. J. MASHAW
& R. MERRILL, supra note 40, at 83.
42 2 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 666 (Oct. 8, 1971).
43 3 C.F.R. 986 (1966-70 Compilation) (reprinted in 33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (Supp. 1977)).
44 See Corps of Engineers, Permits for Discharges or Deposits into Navigable Waters, 35
Fed. Reg. 20,005 (1970).
45 335 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1971) (focusing, inter alia, on the following language from
section 13: "It shall not be lawful to ... discharge ... refuse ... into any tributary of
any navigable water .... [P]rovided further, That the Secretary of the Army ... may permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in navigable waters . . . .") (emphasis
added by the court).
38
39
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into non-navigable waters, placed thousands of industries in administratively inalterable violation of the law and contributed to
the replacement of the Refuse Act Permit Program through the
enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.46 These amendments supplant the Refuse Act
Permit Program with a comprehensive set of procedures for licensing continuous industrial effluent discharges, but leave section 13
in force for use as a prosecutory tool against occasional discharges. 47
Hence, while the subject matter with respect to which the Corps
has authority has remained largely the same, application of the
licensing process to that subject matter has changed. The greatest
change, however, has occurred in the attitude of the Corps. In
response to pressures from Congress, the courts, and the public,
the Corps has changed from an indulgent, laissez-faire regulator
into an active, critical overseer of activities at the land-water
margin.

b.

Territorial Jurisdiction

The Constitution granted Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce,48 but use of that authority to regulate activities in water bodies was at first limited. The United States Supreme
Court ruled that, because the basic reason for inclusion of the commerce clause was to prevent the states from obstructing free trade
on the nation's waterways,49 Congress had authority only over water
bodies that were deemed "navigable" and therefore suitable for
moving goods to or from markets.50 Thus, only navigable waters
were originally subject to section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
This early constitutional history explains in large measure
why, despite the dramatic expansion of the Congress's commerce
power, the Corps asserted its authority only with respect to operations within the banks of navigable water bodies. Moreover, the
Corps was also cautious because of the latent ambiguity of the text
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)).
The permit authority of the Secretary of the Anny has been superseded by the permit
authority provided to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1345 (Supp. V 1975).
48 U .s. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
49 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
50 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); see Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
46

47
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of section I 0. The licensing power given in the second independent
clause of that section does seem to relate only to structures touching
navigable waters. 51 But whether the licensing power given in the
third independent clause over excavation and fill activities must
be causally or spatially linked to navigable waters remains unclear.52 Some recent cases have treated the issue of whether the
Corps has jurisdiction over dredge or fill activities as a causal,
rather than spatial, question-that is, dependent only upon whether
the activities would affect the navigable capacity of a water body,
not upon whether the activities were within the boundaries of a
water body. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently held that the
Corps has jurisdiction over inland canals the excavation of which
would alter or modify nearby navigable waters. 53 The United States
Supreme Court, however, traditionally has measured the Corps'
jurisdiction under section IO of the Act in spatial terms.54
Real concern with precise delimitation of this boundary developed coincidentally with the Corps' new regulatory emphasis
on environmental protection. Developers in marginal areas (areas
on the land-water boundary) sought to avoid rigorous review by
arguing that their projects were not within the geographical ambit
of the Corps' regulatory powers. These efforts triggered administrative, judicial, and legislative responses.
In 1972, to prescribe more precisely the scope of its authority,
the Corps amended its regulations to define "navigable waters of
the United States" as the term is used in the applicable statutes
and regulations.55 The regulations, as amended, first synthesized
the relevant Supreme Court authority into a brief, albeit obscure,
formulation:
Navigable waters of the United States are those waters which are
presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible
for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce. A determination of navigability, once made, applies laterally over the entire

51
52
53

See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
See id.
United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g in part
389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975); cf. United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754
(2d Cir. 1964) (overloading of land causing underlying soil to block channel held violative
of section 10).
54 See, e.g., Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 261-63 (1915).
55 37 Fed. Reg. 18,289-92 (1972) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (1976)).
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surface of the water body, and is not extinguished by later actions
or events which impede or destroy navigable capacity.56

Another amendment added that "navigable waters of the United
States" also include "waters that are subject to ebb and flow of the
tide shoreward to their mean high water mark (mean higher high
water mark on the Pacific Coast)." 57
The 1972 regulations also attempted the more difficult task of
prescribing how to apply these definitions. The extent of the Corps'
jurisdiction was made dependent upon the suitability of the water
body for commercial use; a water body was to be deemed navigable
if evidence existed of historical commercial use, present commercial
use, or potential commercial use. 58 For example, "navigability in
law" might be established with evidence of nineteenth-century
rafting of goods to markets, of current utilization of recreational
craft, or of an area's potential for use as a multi-purpose dam site.
Hence, the Corps' regulatory tentacles can reach far upstream.
Equally important with the presence of commerce in determining navigability are the defined geographic limits of a given water
body. In determining the shoreward limit of jurisdiction under
section IO of the Act, the regulations made an important distinction between fresh water rivers and lakes and salt water oceanic
and tidal waters. In fresh water zones, the Corps' jurisdiction extends laterally to all land and waters below the "ordinary high
water mark." 59 In salt water zones, regulatory jurisdiction extends
to the line on the shore reached by the mean high tide, except on
the Pacific Coast, where the line of the mean of the higher high
tide is used. 60
56 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(c) (1976). These regulations are supported by a detailed annotation and analysis of all relevant Supreme Court decisions. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS & OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF THE .ARMY, ATTORNEY'S SUPPLEMENT: DEFINITION OF NAVIGABLE "WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES (1972).
57 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1) (1976). Most states use the mean high water mark or mean
high tide line to separate private ownership and use of land bordering on navigable waters
from public ownership and use of the water and submerged land. Hoyer, supra note 26,
at 23. See also Gay, The High Water Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands,
18 U. FLA. L. REv. 553, 553.54 & nn.1-2 (1966).
58 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(d)-(i) (1976).
59 Id. § 209.260 (j). The "ordinary high water mark" is determined by calculating the
average of seasonal flow variations.
60 Id.§ 209.260 (k). Each day there are two high tides, one of which rises to a relatively
higher shoreward plane than the other. The mean high tide line is the average of both
tides over 18.6 years; the mean higher high tide line is the average of only the higher
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Application of these general principles has proved most troublesome in three areas: first, in defining the limits of marsh areas;
second, in applying the principles to canal systems; third, in adjusting the Corps' jurisdiction to the changing boundary of the
shoreline.

(i)

Wetlands

The use of the "ordinary high water" or "mean high tide" line
as the lateral limit of the Corps' regulatory authority has geodesic
and hydrologic ramifications that make demarcation difficult.
Though the lines may be relatively easy to survey at a given point
in time on an ocean beach, they are inordinately difficult to draw
in a sprawling tidal estuary, with its myriad of rivulets that creep
into the marsh at high tide. The line is also difficult to draw
through the wetlands that abound in the area between tidal water
and fastland (high and dry land), portions of which are regularly
inundated by tidal action.
The regulations respond to this problem in a separate subsection
dealing with the shoreward limit of jurisdiction over bays and estuaries. In pertinent part, this subsection provides that the entire
estuarine water surface is within the Corps' jurisdiction, "even
though portions of the water body may be extremely shallow, or
obstructed by shoals, vegetation, or other barriers. Marshlands and
similar areas are thus considered 'navigable in law,' but only so far
as the area is subject to inundation by the mean high waters." 61
Cases in lower federal courts have generally adopted a similar approach. In a 1971 decision, the Southern District of New York
enjoined the New York National Guard from filling a tidal marsh
upon a finding that "the water within the area is equal in ebb and
flow to that of the river which is concededly navigable." 62 The
Southern District of Georgia agreed, observing that, "[t]he lay
mind does not readily grasp the concept that marshes adjacent
to a navigable stream are themselves deemed to be navigable and
subject to federal regulatory jurisdiction." 63 Other federal courts
of the two high tides for the same period. Use by the Corps of the higher high tide line
on the Pacific was judicially aproved in Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D.
Cal 1974).
61 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (k)(2) (1976).
62 United States v. Baker, 2 E.R.C. 1849, 1850 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
63 United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
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have similarly enjoined filling or ordered restoration of marshland subject to regular tidal inundation.64 In one recent case, however, the Southern District of Mississippi, while recognizing that
it had the power to order complete restoration of a partially filled
tidal marsh, refused to do so because of the hardship it would place
on those who, although negligent, had acted in good faith. 65
The growing awareness of the high biological value of marshes
has resulted in efforts to extend the Corps' section 10 jurisdiction
to wetlands that are only occasionally subject to tidal action. The
record is mixed. In 1972, the federal district court in Oregon
ordered a company to remove a landfill (intended for eventual
residential or commercial development) from an estuarine area
where a river flowed into tidal flatlands. 66 The river meandered in
northerly and southerly directions, and the area below mean high
water depended on the course of the river. There was a conflict in
the evidence over whether the site of the company's fill was above
mean high water when the filling occurred, but the court apparently felt that this made no difference. 67 Instead, the court
observed:
In effect what defendant did was to catch the river at a time when
it was to the north, and fix the sandspit permanently while it was
temporarily (and partially) above mean high water. If that were
permissible, obviously the owner of the northerly spit could have
done the same, w;,iting for the day when the river was fl.owing to
the south. By taking advantage of temporary variations, the river
could be pinned down and perhaps much of the estuary could be
filled in and eliminated. In the opinion of the Court, the decision to
so alter a water impressed with a public servitude is a decision which
must be made by the lawfully authorized public agency, and not by
private persons. The sand fill was contrary not only to the letter of
the statute but also to its spirit. 68

But in another case, the Delaware federal district court declined
to rule on the government's contention that its jurisdiction under
64 See, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 512 F.2d 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
928 (1975); United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. 1937 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States v. Keevan,
7 E.R.C. 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
63 United States v. American Capital Land Corp., 8 E.R.C. 1654, 1656 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
66 United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1023 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd in part,
modified in part per curiam, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
67 See 5 E.R.C. at 1026-27.
68 Id. at 1027.
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section 10 extends to all portions of tidal marsh adjacent to navigable waters, including those portions of marsh area not inundated
at mean high tide, and to any area beyond the limits of navigable
water where such activities as filling, excavation, and bulkheading
would affect "navigable water." 69 Federal district courts in California and Florida adopted an alternative approach to this question,
finding that the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act gave the Corps jurisdiction over wetlands, notwithstanding any restrictive reading of section 10 of the 1899 Act.70

Canals
The Corps' 1972 regulations give but cursory attention to
the special jurisdictional problems created by canals and other
artificial waterways. An artificial watenvay, although shoreward
of the mean high tide line,71 may nonetheless be subject to regulation. These regulations provide that, " [a]n artificial channel may
often constitute a navigable water of the United States, even though
it has been privately developed and maintained, or passes through
private property. The test is generally ... whether the water body
is capable of use for purposes of interstate commerce." 72 This
ambiguous language offers little assistance in determining when
the cutting of a canal into fastland shoreward of (above) the mean
high tide line requires permission from the Corps under section I 0
of the Act. The case law suggests at least three plausible and differing approaches to this question, each approach based on some
aspect of section IO or the 1972 regulations. The first approach
treats the problem as one of territorial jurisdiction-granting the
Corps jurisdiction over the canal if the canal is itself navigable,
that is, subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. 73 This was essentially
the approach that the federal district court for the Southern District
of Florida adopted in two 197 5 decisions.74 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed these cases and adopted a second approach that re(ii)

United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1049-51 (D. Del. 1973).
See Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States
v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); notes 90-105 infra and accompanying text.
71 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
72 33 C.F.R. § 209.260 (g)(l)(i) (1976).
73 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
74 See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975),
rev'd in part, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); Weiszmann v. Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. 1523
(S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd in part, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976).
<l9

70
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quired an inquiry into whether the activity "altered" or "modified"
existing waters under section 10 of the Act.75 In United States v.
Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., which involved a mobile home development interspersed with a network of canals, the Fifth Circuit employed this test and held that a Corps permit was required for construction of those canals that directly connected with a tidal sound
because the canals changed the shoreline, thereby affecting the
navigable capacity of the area. 76 On the other hand, the court held
that the Corps had no jurisdiction over construction of landlocked
canals shoreward of the mean high tide because their construction
did not affect navigable waters, and that mere tidal fluctuation
after excavation is not proof of such an effect.77
Yet a third approach was suggested by the Hawaii federal district
court in 1976.78 There the question was whether the Corps had
regulatory jurisdiction over a private channel cut two miles inland
from the barrier bay to a "fish pond" that the developer had converted into a marina. The court determined that the Corps had
section IO jurisdiction because the channel, having been used in
conjunction with a commercial recreational development, was in
fact supporting interstate commerce.79
Regardless of the approach used, practical problems remain
with respect to whether the Corps will be able effectively to assert
jurisdiction over creation of canals. Developers of extensive canal
systems designed to provide pleasure boat access to residential
subdivisions have sometimes tried to avoid regulation of their
projects by completing the excavation of the canal before connecting it to navigable water. The Corps responded to this practice in
a 1974 amendment to its regulations, providing that (1) the proponent of canal work that is intended to be connected to navigable
water should submit his application before performing any work;
and (2) the existence of a partially completed excavation will not
weigh favorably in evaluation of the permit application. 80
See note 22 supra.
526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g in part 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
77 526 F.2d at 1298-99.
78 United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Hawaii 1976).
70 Id. at 52-54.
so 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (ll)(i) & (ii) (1976); see 526 F.2d at 1299 n.15. See also 33 C.F.R.
§ 209.260(g)(l) (1976).
75

76
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Changing Boundaries

The United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., asserted: "When once
found to be navigable, a waterway remains so." 81 This rule of
"indelible navigability" was developed in the context of a dispute
over the upstream limits of federal jurisdiction. In this context, the
question is whether this rule should likewise apply to the changing
shorelines of tidal water.
Some authority exists for application of federal jurisdiction to
such shorelines. In a 1949 action to quiet title, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that private landowners, part of whose property was under water, had an unqualified ownership in fee simple only down to the high water mark of
the river in 1794, when their predecessors first acquired title.
Beyond that point, the United States could exercise, without compensating the owners, its power over navigation. 82
The "once tidal, forever navigable" rule suggested by this case
would be overwhelmed by its own impracticability if used to measure the present lateral margins of the Corps' jurisdiction;
200-year-old geodesic and hydrologic data are difficult to find.
Other federal courts have rejected this rule. The Third Circuit,
for example, has held expressly that the Corps no longer has regulatory authority over tidal wetlands that became fastland prior
to the Corps' assertion of regulatory power in the area.83 This
decision was consistent with the Corps' own position, set out in its
1972 regulations, that its jurisdiction changes with the shoreline:
Permanent changes of the shoreline configuration result in similar
alterations of the boundaries of the navigable water. Thus, gradual
changes which are due to natural causes and are perceptible only
over some period of time constitute changes in the bed of a water
body which also change the shoreline boundaries of navigable waters.
However, an area will remain "navigable in law," even though no
longer covered with water, whenever the change has occurred suddenly, or was caused by artificial forces intended to produce that
change. For example, shifting sand bars within a river or estuary
311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940) (footnote omitted).
United States v. Martin, 177 F.2d 733, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957
(1950).
83 United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 610-ll (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975).
81

82
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remain part of the navigable water, regardless that they may be dry at
a particular point in time.84

Subsequent cases have supported the Corps' position. In 1973,
the federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected a claim that the Corps' jurisdiction extended to a downtown
parking lot that had been the site of a canal prior to 1880. 85 Notwithstanding Appalachian Electric, the court said that it could not
"overlook the simple fact that the geographic entity in question in
this case is a parking lot, and a parking lot, despite the most sophisticated legal arguments, buttressed by the most vivid of imaginations, is not a navigable water of the United States." 86 Similarly,
the Supreme Court recognized in another context that the grantee
of land bounded by a body of navigable water acquires a right to
any natural and gradual accretion formed along the shore. 87 On the
other hand, as previously detailed, the Corps continues to have
jurisdiction over an area where a private party artificially stabilizes
a moving sand dune while it is temporarily above mean high
water, 88 or where evaporation ponds have been diked off for salt
production. 89
The territorial limits on the Corps' section IO jurisdiction remain undefined. Certainly the Corps' regulatory authority encompasses "navigable" water bodies. Yet, the notion of "navigability"
has proved too illusory, and the boundaries of bodies of water too
subject to change, to permit clear delineation.

2. Statutory and Judicial Expansion of the Corps' Jurisdiction
Under Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments
Enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 90 has significantly affected the Corps' regulatory
jurisdiction. The amendments established as a national goal the
33 C.F.R. § 209.260(l) (1976).
James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 F.
Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
86 359 F. Supp. at 640.
87 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
88 See United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1023 (D. Ore. 1973), affd in part,
modified in part per curiam, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975);
text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
89 See Sierra Cub v. Leslie Salt Co., 412 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
90 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)).
84

85
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elimination of the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by
1985.91 The principal mechanism established by the amendments
for achieving this goal was the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 92 under which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the discharge of pollutants into waters
by means of a permit system that can be transferred to the states.
By including dredged spoil, rock, sand, and cellar dirt within
the definition of pollutants, 93 the amendments created a potential
overlap between the new NPDES and the Corps' traditional jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Filling in navigable
waters would have constituted both the discharge of pollutants
requiring an NPDES permit and construction activity requiring a
Corps permit. To avoid this overlap, Congress included section
404, which authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through
the Corps of Engineers, to regulate discharges of dredged or fill
material into waters of the United States. 94
While, at first glance, section 404 appears effectively to anticipate
and avoid confusion and redundancy, it has created a brouhaha
that continues today. In 1974, a Florida federal district court
agreed with the position of the EPA that federal jurisdiction under
the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA extends to all water capable
of affecting commerce, regardless of whether they are deemed
"navigable" under traditional legal tests.95 Although the Corps
readily acceded to the proposition that its permission was necessary
in order to fill a wetland under the terms of the FWPCA (it was
already licensing many such activities under section IO of the
Rivers and Harbors Act), it vigorously resisted the proposition
that its licensing authority extended beyond the boundaries of
navigable water as traditionally defined. 96 Accordingly, the Corps'
1974 revised regulations maintained the preexisting territorial
limitations on its jurisdiction.97
Id. § l0l(a)(l), 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975)).
Id. § 402, 86 Stat. 880 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975)).
93 See id. § 502 (6), 86 Stat. 886 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (6) (Supp. V 1975)).
94 See id.§ 404, 86 Stat. 884 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1975)). EPA, however,
is authorized to adopt guidelines for the specification of disposal sites. Id. No statutory
provision in the Act delegates the Corps' regulatory powers under section 404 to the states.
115 United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). See also United States v.
Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
96 See 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (1974).
97 See 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (1974).
91

92
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This resistance to expansion of territorial jurisdiction was successfully challenged in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Callaway when the federal district court for the District of Columbia ordered the Corps to amend its regulations so as to extend its
territorial jurisdiction under section 404 of the FWPCA to "all
waters of the United States," not merely to the traditional "navigable" waters.98 This decree triggered an ongoing and acrimonious debate among the Corps, EPA, various interest groups, and
the Congress.
The Corps' first step in complying with Callaway was to publish
for public comment and review alternative redefinitions of its
powers with respect to dredge and fill operations. 99 Interim final
regulations were published on July 25, 1975, and became effective
on that date. 100 The regulations provided for a three phase expansion of the areas within which the Corps was to license the discharge of dredged or fill material.101 During Phase I (July 25, 1975
through July 1, 1976), the Corps was to regulate disposal of dredge
or fill material not only within the traditional area of its jurisdiction, but also within "wetlands contiguous and adjacent thereto." 102
To the extent that the regulations apply to wetlands above mean
high tide or mean high water, Phase I constitutes only a modest
lateral extension of the Corps' authority.103 This phase, moreover,
was in accordance with previous federal district court decisions
that approved lateral extension of federal authority to contiguous
wetlands under the FWPCA.104
The next two phases have proved more controversial. Phase II
os 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). Ironically, according to Senator Muskie, Senate
floor manager for the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA, the overall impact of section 404
on the Corps' territorial jurisdiction was largely inadvertent. Section 404 was intended
only to avoid redundancy of permit programs with respec~ to the disposal of dredge spoil.
See 122 CONG. REc. Sl4,909-ll (daily ed. Aug. 30, 1976).
90 See 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766 (1975).
100 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324-26 (1975) (codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)-(e) (1976)).
101 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (e)(2) (1976).
102 Id. § 209.120(e)(2)(i)(a).
103 See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra. Compare 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e)(2)(i)(a)
(1976) with 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(j)-(k) (1973).
104 See, e.g., P.F.Z. Prop;rties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975); United
States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. 1937 (E.D. Va. 1975); Weiszmann v. Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C.
1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975) , rev'd in part, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); cf. Leslie Salt &>. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292,
1297 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (mean high higher waters is reasonable interpretation of "waters of
the United States").
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(July 1, 1976 through July 1, 1977) extends the Corps' jurisdiction
over the disposal of dredged or fill material upstream into primary
tributaries, freshwater wetlands contiguous or adjacent thereto,
and lakes. 105 Phase III (after July 1, 1977) extends the Corps'
jurisdiction over discharges of dredged or fill material to virtually
all waters that Congress may regulate under the commerce clause. 106
These waters include territorial seas, coastal tidewater, rivers, lakes,
and streams that are navigable in fact 107 and, more significantly,
those tributaries, rivers, lakes, and streams that, although not navigable in fact, are utilized for interstate commercial or recreational
purposes. 108 Also subject to regulation are the wetlands adjacent or
contiguous to these water bodies. 109
During Phase I, the entire set of regulations was subject to further review and comment. Public response was almost evenly
divided between favorable and unfavorable comments.110 The
response of certain groups was predictable. Environmentalists almost unanimously supported expanding the Corps' jurisdiction,
viewing it as a mechanism for making the filling (and obliteration)
of wetlands more difficult. Officials of the Department of the
Interior (DOI) and EPA joined in this support. 111
Opponents of the proposed expansion of the Corps' jurisdiction
included state bureaucrats, farmers, home builders, and highway
builders. They viewed the Corps' expanded jurisdiction as federal
intrusion into the field of land use control without the approval of
Congress. Furthermore, they characterized the new procedures as
"cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive," asserting that
farmers would be required to obtain a permit every time they
wished to plow a field, dig a ditch, or build a pond.11 2
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e}(2)(i)(b) (1976).
Id. § 209.120(e)(2)(i)(c).
107 See text accompanying notes 56·57 supra.
108 For the administrative definition of the Corps' territorial jurisdiction under section 404 of the FWPCA, see 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (2) (1976).
109 "Wetlands" are defined to include bordering lands that support aquatic vegetation.
See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(b) & (h) (1976).
110 See 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1963 (1976) (50% of comments were favorable, 43% unfavorable, 7% no clear preference).
111 See 122 CONG. REc. H5275 (daily ed. June 3, 1976) (remarks of Nathaniel Reed,
Ass't Sec'y of the Interior); 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2172 (1976) (remarks of Russell Train,
EPA Administrator).
112 See, e.g., 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 643 (1975) (comment of Robert W. Long, Ass't Sec'y
of Agric.).
105

106
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As opposition mounted in Congress, the Corps responded to the
attacks.11 3 Opponents of broader jurisdiction estimated that, while
under its traditional jurisdiction, the Corps would have processed
9,000 permits during fiscal year 1976, under expanded jurisdiction,
the Corps might have to process as many as 50,000; therefore, the
program was deemed too costly and the issuance of permits too
slow. In response, the Corps estimated a more modest increase,
from 10,500 to 20,773 permits (only 1,149 of which were attributed to section 404 alone).11 4 In addition, the Corps pointed out
that the new regulations provided for a "general permitting"
mechanism that would allow expedited processing of permits
relating to ecologically insignificant activities.11 5 Arguments that
the section 404 program would cause wasteful duplication of effort
ignored the availability of joint processing and the possibility of
future amendments to FWPCA providing for delegation of section
404 programs to the states (similar to the NPDES delegation now
permitted).116 The Corps asserted that the section 404 program
would not interfere with ordinary farming operations, noting that
the regulations, by not considering material from normal farming
operations as "fill material" subject to regulation, therefore provide
an agricultural definition of sorts.117
In 1976, the 94th Congress responded belatedly to the controversy by considering various changes in section 404 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. Among the proposals suggested
were contraction of the Corps' territorial jurisdiction, exemption
of farming and other small scale operations, delegation of Phases
II and III to the states, and outright repeal of section 404. 118 In
order to give Congress more time to make up its mind, President
Ford ordered a suspension of implementation of Phase II, which
had been scheduled to take effect on July I, for sixty days.11 9 Congress, however, adjourned on September 30 without reaching agreement.
113 See generally 122 CoNG. REc. H5221-80 (daily ed. June 3, 1976); Senate Hearings,
supra note 4.
114 See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 56; Interview with William Hedeman, Counsel
for Regulatory Programs, Office of General Counsel, Department of the Army, Nov. 7,
1976.
115 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (i) (2) (ix) (1976) .
11~ 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1963 (1976); see text accompanying note 92 supra.
117 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(6)(i) (1976).
118 See Senate Hearings, s!,fpra note 4.
119 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 435 (1976).

HeinOnline -- 63 Va. L. Rev.

525 1977

526

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 63:503

The Corps is now implementing Phase II of its section 404
program,120 and the 95th Congress is only beginning to address the
issue left unresolved by the 94th. Congress may find it desirable to
preserve the program for two reasons. First, despite the heated
debate, the expanded jurisdiction that the section 404 program
establishes relates only to dredge and fill activities, not to other
construction activities. Consequently, the licensing of other coastal
alterations will be limited to traditional Corps' territory. Second,
amending section 404 so as to change the definition of navigability would destroy the predictability created by many years of
adjudication and require extensive relitigation to redefine navigability for purposes of section 404.

B. Decision Criteria and Procedures
1. Evolution
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act traditionally was
viewed as presenting the Corps of Engineers with a modest and
manageable job. Permit applications were reviewed only to determine whether the proposed structure or activity would impede
the free flow of maritime traffic. The Justice Department and the
courts shared this limited view of the Act's concerns.121 Licensing
criteria, when adopted at all, were little more than loose rules of
thumb. For example, the Baltimore District Office applied a fourpart test:
1. The structure must not exceed one-third the width of the
waterway.
2. The applicant must stay away from the deepest portion
of the waterway.
3. The applicant must not build within 15 feet of a dredged
channelway.
4. The applicant in general must avoid any hazards to navigation.122
120 In United States v. Byrd, 9 E.R.C. 1275 (N.D. Ind. 1976), the court upheld the Corps
assertion of jurisdiction over a "phase II" wetland.
121 See, e.g., Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dem, 86 F.2d 135, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1936)
(permit applicant entitled to decision based "exclusively on evidence directed to the ques•
tion whether . . . [the project] will obstruct the navigable capacity of the waterway");
27 OP. A-rr'Y GEN. 284 (1909) (Corps need not consider detrimental effects of proposed
structure on nearby bathing beach).
122 Information obtained through interviews with personnel of the Baltimore District
Office of the Corps, fall, 1976.
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Section 11 of the Rivers and Harbors Act further reduced the
workload by authorizing the Corps to draw harbor lines in congested areas within which work could be done without specific
permission.123
In recent years, however, the criteria that the Act requires the
Corps to consider in processing applications have increased dramatically. A 1958 amendment to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act began the change by providing that "wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with
other features of water-resource development." 124 Consequently,
in a somewhat belated 1967 memorandum of understanding, the
Corps agreed to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service of the
Department of the Interior before issuing permits. 125
The Corps amended its regulations in 1968 to allow consideration of the "general public interest" when considering permit application.126 This action proved to be foresighted because a 1970
report of the House Committee on Government Operations advocated that the Corps "increase its consideration of the effects which
the proposed work will have, not only on navigation, but also on
conservation of natural resources, fish and wildlife, air and water
quality, esthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology, and other
public interest aspects of the waterway." 127 The report also pointed
123

124
125
126
127

This section, presently codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 404 (1970), provides:
§ 404. Establishment of harbor lines; conditions to grants for extension of piers, etc.
Where it is made manifest to the Secretary of the Army that the establishment
of harbor lines is- essential to the preservation and protection of harbors he may,
and is, authorized to cause such lines to be established, beyond which no piers,
wharves, bulkheads, or other works shall be extended or deposits made, except
under such regulations as may be prescribed from time to time by him: Provided,
That whenever the Secretary of the Army grants to any person or persons permission to extend piers, wharves, bulkheads, or other works, or to make deposits in any
tidal harbor or river of the United States beyond any harbor lines established
under authority of the United States, he shall cause to be ascertained the amount
of tidewater displaced by any such structure or by any such deposits, and he shall,
if he deem it necessary, require the parties to whom the permission is given to make
compensation for such displacement either by excavating in some part of the
harbor, including tidewater channels between high and low water mark, to such
an extent as to create a basin for as much tidewater as may be displaced by such
structure or by such deposits, or in any other mode that may be satisfactory to him.
See Pub. L. No. 85-624, § 2, 72 Stat. 563 (1958) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1970)).
See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120, Appendix B (1976).
See note 36 supra.
See HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 2 (emphasis added).
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out that the Corps was then using significantly different review
procedures in areas of navigable waters where "harbor lines" had
been established than in areas where they had not. 128 Under thenexisting Corps regulations, when large areas of submerged lands
were shoreward of harbor lines, submerged land within the lines
could be filled without a permit while submerged land outside
129
harbor lines could be altered only upon issuance of a permit.
The Corps immediately responded to this congressional criticism with regulations requiring permits for work performed within
harbor lines,130 but awaited the outcome of a test case before taking
further action. Then, in 1970, the Fifth Circuit held in Zabel v.
Tabb 131 that, when the 1970 House Committee report, the 1958
amendment to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, and the
National Environmenta l Policy Act 132 are considered together,
"there is no doubt that the Secretary can refuse on conservation
133
grounds to grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act."
The Corps, therefore, was free to consider a full range of .environmental concerns in the processing of permit applications.

Criteria for Evaluating Applications: The 1974 Regulations
In 1974, the Corps promulgated new regulations that completely
revised the criteria and procedures involved in evaluation of permit
applications. 134 Review is now a general balancing process that
weighs the benefits that reasonably may be expected to accrue
from a proposed project against its reasonably foreseeable detriments:
2.

All factors that may be relevant to the proposal must be considered;
among those factors are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general
environmental concerns, historic values, fish and wildlife values,
flood-damage prevention, land-use classifications, navigation, recreation, water supply, water quality, and, in general, the needs and
12s
129
130
131
132
133
134

See id. at 11-13.
See id. at 7.
See 35 Fed. Reg. 8280 (1970) (codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.150 (1976)).
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
430 F.2d at 214.
39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (1974) (codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(£) (1976)).
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welfare of the people. No permit will be granted unless its issuance
is found to be in the public interest.135 .

In its "public interest" review, according to the regulations, the
Corps must consider four general criteria in the evaluation of every
application: (I) the relative extent of the public and private need
for the proposed activity; (2) the desirability of using appropriate
alternative locations and methods; (3) the extent and permanence
of the proposed activity's effects, both beneficial and detrimental,
on the public and private uses to which the area is suited; and (4)
the probable impact of each proposal in relation to the cumulative
effect created by other existing and proposed activities within the
general area. 136
To facilitate the application of these very general criteria, the
regulations state specific policies that must be considered in the
balancing process. The following projects generally will be permitted: shore erosion control structures; piers, docks, or moorings
for small boats; and fixed and floating aids to navigation. 137 The
following projects generally will not be permitted: projects that
unduly interfere with access or use of navigable water from nearby
property; projects that fail to mitigate damage to fish and wildlife
resources; projects that will not comply with effluent limitations or
water quality standards; and projects that have a deleterious impact
on wild and scenic rivers, national historic preservation sites, sites
in the National Registry of Natural Landmarks, and other areas of
special national interest as designated by Congress.138 Because wetlands are "environmentally vital areas," 139 the regulations prohibit
the granting of permits for work in wetlands identified as important unless the public interest requires otherwise and unless
the District Engineer concludes, on the basis of the general criteria,
not only that the benefits of the proposed activity outweigh the
damage to the wetlands resource, but also that the proposed alteration is necessary to realize those benefits.14° For a permit to be approved, the proposed activity must be dependent on proximity
135
136
137
138
139

140

33 C.F.R. § 209.120(£)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
Id. § 209.120(f)(2)(i)-(iv).
See id. § 209.120(g) (l)(i) (a), (7), (8).
See id. § 209.120(g)(l)(i)(b), (4)(i), (5)(i), (6).
See id. § 209.120(g)(3).
See id. § 209.120(g)(3)(iv).
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to important wetlands and there must be no feasible alternative
sites available. 141

3. The Problems of Statutory Criteria: Requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1.969
The general and specific criteria imposed by the 1974 regulations
offer only limited assistance to the Corps in the evaluation of permit applications. Determining what factors are "relevant to the
proposal" and "in the public interest" is difficult. The requirements and criteria specified by the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEP A) 142 to be observed in the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) are similarly ambiguous.
NEPA requires preparation of an EIS with respect to "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 143
'
Before the passage of NEPA, regulations required that the Corps
evaluate applications on the basis of broad "general public interest" criteria. 144 In response to the new statute, new regulations
were promulgated. The Corps addresses the relationship of NEP A's
requirements to its regulatory program by providing for a two-step
process. First, the District Engineer is to make an "environmental
assessment" (a miniature EIS) of the likely impact of the proposed
activity. Then, if "the District Engineer believes that granting the
permit may be warranted but that the proposed activity would
significantly affect the quality of the human environment," an EIS
will be prepared. 145
Although NEPA appears to leave federal agencies with much
discretion in determining what "major" federal actions "significantly" affect the quality of life, the federal courts have translated
NEPA's seemingly hortatory language into "action-forcing" procedures. The Corps had originally taken the position that NEPA's
EIS requirement had no application to the program for licensing
the discharge of refuse under section 13 of the 1899 Act when the
question was solely one of water quality. This position was rejected
See id. § 209.120(g)(3)(iv)(a).
42 u.s.c. §§ 4331-4347 (1970).
143 Id. § 4332(2) (c).
144 See text accompanying note 126 supra.
145 33 C.F.R. § 209.410(e)(7)(iii) (1976).
141
142
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by a federal district court in 1971.1.w And in Sierra Club v. Morton, 147 a California federal district court held that the EIS requirement applied to permits granted under sections 9 and l O of the Act
as well. The court asserted that, "[t]he issuance of ... a permit
pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 always constitutes
major federal action and unless the Corps of Engineers ... makes
the negative determination that issuance has no significant effect on
the environment, an EIS is required." 148
Not only the type of permits subject to the NEPA, but also the
procedures by which the Corps makes a "negative determination"
have been issues of contention. Clearly, the Corps has the authority to make its own threshold determination of whether an
EIS is required, 149 but the propriety of the procedure by which
such a determination is reached is subject to review. For instance,
the Fourth Circuit has held that a District Engineer had not
abused his discretion in determining, on the basis of a desk review
of generally favorable comments of various federal, state, and local
agencies, that an EIS was not a prerequisite to issuance of a permit
for construction of fishing piers and a boat basin.150 On the other
hand, the Southern District of New York has enjoined landfilling
and construction on the Hudson River because the Corps failed to
hold a public hearing and othenvise to build an "environmental
record" of the reasons for its decision that an EIS was unnecessary.151
Finally, the substantive standard of decisionmaking that the
District Engineer is to employ in determining whether an EIS is
necessary has also been the subject of litigation. The Corps' guidelines are complemented by guidelines promulgated by the Council
on Environmental Quality.152 Among the criteria provided for
identifying major actions significant in affecting the environment
Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971).
147 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
148 Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
140 See Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696, 706-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
150 Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973) .
151 River Defense Comm. v. Thiermano, 380 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court
relied heavily on Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972), which made it clear that federal agencies must establish revicwable environmental
records.
152 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1976).
146 See
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is expected public reaction: "Proposed major actions, the environmental impact of which is likely to be highly controversial, should
be covered in all cases." 153 Hence, in a recent Fourth Circuit
case,154 the plaintiff argued that, regardless of the reasonableness
of the District Engineer's "negative determination," an EIS was
required because there was widespread opposition to the project.
The court rejected this position, saying:
We reject, however, the suggestion that "controversial" must necessarily be equated with opposition. The term should properly refer to
cases where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature or effect
of the major federal action rather than to the existence of opposition
to a use. Otherwise, to require an impact statement whenever a
threshold determination dispensing with one is likely to face a court
challenge would surrender the determination to opponents of a
federal action, no matter whether major or not, nor how insignificant
its environmental effect might be.155

While the concern of the court is understandable, its conclusion
that there is no "controversy" because the arguments made by
numerous and vocal opponents of a project happen to be illfounded is rather sophistic.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's faith in a District Engineer,
some courts have been willing to review the merits of a District
Engineer's decision with respect to whether an EIS is legally required. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 156 conservation groups brought
suit to contest construction of three major facilities of the California Water Project. Because the court found that the Corps'
issuance of permits would constitute "major federal action," and
all concerned admitted that the projects would have "significant
effects on the environment," the court ordered preparation of
Environmental Impact Statements prior to any issuance of permits.157
The sufficiency of Environmental Impact Statements may be
challenged judicially. For example, in a recent Florida case, the
plaintiff attempted a scatter-gun assault on the adequacy of the EIS
that supported issuance of a permit for construction of a staging
153 Id. § 1500.6 (a).
154 Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th
155 Id. at 162.
.
156 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
157 Id. at 644-48.

Cir. 1973).
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area for the manufacture of floating nuclear power plants.158
Despite the plaintiff's assertions that the EIS was inaccurate, lacked
objectivity, and failed to consider all relevant factors, the federal
district court found the EIS acceptable. 159 Generally, however,
courts have been quite aggressive in challenging the adequacy of
Environmental Impact Statements prepared in support of the
Corps' public works projects.160 While more specific criteria and
procedures might facilitate reduction of the foregoing types of litigation and problems that NEPA has presented the Corps, the
differing degrees of complexity among projects and the high costs
of conducting an EIS make the continued use of general standards
understandable.
Environmental assessments vary dramatically in nature from pro
forma disclaimers to studies contracted out at costs in excess of
$100,000.161 In the vast preponderance of cases, a negative determination is made; for example, during fiscal 1976, the Baltimore District of the Corps prepared Environmental Impact Statements for
only two of 1,476 applications.rn2 When an EIS is prepared, the
expenses in time and money are enormous. During fiscal year 1975,
the Corps took an average of nine months to prepare a draft EIS;
during calendar year 1974, an average of ten and one-half months
elapsed between filing of the draft and the final EIS. 163 During
fiscal year 1974, the Corps spent 22 million dollars on the EIS
process-1.2% of its budget.164 For several reasons, however, these
figures are somewhat misleading: most of the Environmental Impact Statements are prepared for civil works projects, not permit
applications under the Rivers and Harbors Act; the cost figures do
not include environmental assessment costs; and the Corps has
established procedures for charging fees for federal EIS preparation
to project applicants. 165 Nevertheless, NEPA's general standards
Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Callaway, 6 E.R.C. 1320 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
Id. at 1325-27.
160 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
161, Telephone conversation with James Durkay, Regulatory Functions Branch, Baltimore District Corps of Engineers, Aug. 3, 1976.
162 Id.
163 REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACf STATE·
MENTS 29-30 (1976).
164 Id. at 46.
165 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (h) (2)(vi) (1976). The statutory authorization for this procedure
is 31 U.S.C. § 483 (a) (1970). The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that fees charged
158
159
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have increased significantly the workload of the Corps by the regulations' requirement of an environmental assessment of each proposed activity. The ambiguity of NEPA also has caused new
challenges in the courts to the issuance of permits-challenges that
will only increase in the future.

4.

Procedures for Processing Applications

The general and specific criteria described above give little
practical guidance to the Corps in the evaluation of the many
permit applications received. In fiscal year 1976, the Corps received over 20,000 applications for permits under the Rivers and
Harbors Act and the FWPCA.166 Hence, each of the Corps' district
offices annually must evaluate thousands of applications without
clear standards with respect to whether an application should be
approved. In such uncertainty it is not surprising that permit
review may prove more procedural than substantive-and there is
no shortage of procedures with which to comply.
In large measure, the Corps' lengthy regulations are designed
merely to lay out the course that permits must follow en route to
issuance. 167 These procedures, partially self-imposed and partially
a response to various overlapping congressional mandates, apply to
applications arising under both section IO of the Rivers and Harbors Act and section 404 of the FWPCA.
Each district office of the Corps routinely circulates applications
to other concerned federal, regional, state, or local agencies having
jurisdiction over or interest in the proposed activity. Permits will
not be issued where certification or authorization of the proposed
work is required by federal, state, or local law and such certification or authorization has been denied.168 Among the federal statutes that may require separate certification or authorization are:
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act;160 the Coastal Zone
Management Act; 170 and the Marine Protection, Research and
must approximate "value to the recipient." National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1974).
166 Interview with ·wmiam Hedeman, Counsel for Regulatory Programs, Office of
General Counsel, Department of the Army, Nov. 7, 1976.
167 See 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.II0-.410 (1976).
168 Id. § 209.120 (f) (3).
169 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. V 1975).
110 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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Sanctuaries Act.171 State laws requiring approval may include
pollution, wetlands, and industrial siting statutes; local laws requiring approval may include zoning and harbor regulations.
The District Engineer also must consider the views of interested
governmental agencies that do not have regulatory powers. He
must consult, inter alia, officials from the Department of Interior
(DOI), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture, and appropriate state agencies. 172 Lower echelons of the
Corps defer to the judgment of DOI officials regarding tlie impact
of a project on fish and wildlife.173 If the proposed project may
affect water quality, section 401 of the FWPCA requires a certificate of compliance with applicable quality standards and effluent
limitations. If EPA objects, notwithstanding issuance of the certificate, the permit must be forwarded to Washington for final action
at higher Ievels. 174
At the state level, various state agencies submit comments to
the District Engineer. If there is disagreement among the agencies,
the District Engineer will solicit the views of the Governor. Regional, state, and local plans are viewed as reflecting local factors
of the public interest. When there is a favorable state determination, the District Engineer ordinarily will issue the permit, provided the project complies with federal statutory criteria and the
Corps' regulations. 175 The regulations also provide that in states
with ongoing permit programs for work in navigable waters, the
Corps may enter into agreements for joint processing and evaluation of both the Corps and the state permit applications.176
The District Engineer must also notify the public of the application. He uses responses to such notification to gauge community
sentiment. If response to a notice indicates a need for further public
discussion, the District Engineer may hold a public hearing.177 In
16 U.S.C. § 1432(£) (Supp. V 1975).
172 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (f) (4) (1976).
173 See id. §§ 209.120(g) (4), .120 Appendix B.
174 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(5) (1976).
175 Id. § 209.120(f)(3)(i), (iii).
176 Id. § 209.120(f)(3)(v).
177 See 41 Fed. Reg. 28,952 (1976), superseding 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120 (k), .405 (1976) (to
be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.133).
171
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addition, he must determine whether he must prepare a formal
Environmental Impact Statement.178
Finally, assuming that he has fulfilled all these requirements,
the District Engineer must decide whether to authorize the project
or activity; and, if he grants permission, whether it will take the
form of a letter of permission, a separate permit, or a general
permit. He issues letters of permission in a summary manner upon
a finding that, subject to section IO of the Rivers and Harbors Act,
the proposed work is minor, noncontroversial, and without significant impact on environmental values.179 Separate permits are standardized forms. 180 General permits are a recent innovation designed
to help relieve the load created by the Corps' new responsibilities
under section 404 of FWPCA.181 The District Engineer may issue
a general permit for certain categories of structures, and, thereafter, activities within the category need not be individually
licensed. 182
Information from the Baltimore District Corps of Engineers
illustrates how these procedures may be working. During the 1976
fiscal year, 1,476 applications were received, 335 letters of permission were given, 673 permits were granted, and 279 activities were
allowed under general permit.183
C. Private Rights
In form, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 is a criminal statute. Sections IO and 13 make certain activities unlawful if done
without specified permission; sections 12 and 16 prescribe fines
and prison sentences that may be imposed on violators. 184 The
question arises, therefore, whether the Act serves as a basis for
other public and private rights and remedies. In Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that
the federal government may recover civil damages occasioned by
violations of the Act,1 85 and in Cort v. Ash, the Court intimated
See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra.
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(m) (3) (1976).
See id. § 209.120 Appendix C.
181 See text accompanying notes 90-105 supra.
182 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (i) (2) (ix) (1976).
183 Telephone conversation with James Durkay, Regulatory Functions Branch, Baltimore
District Corps of Engineers, Aug. 3, 1976.
184 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 406, 407, 411 (1970).
185 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
178

179
180
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that the Act created private rights as well. 100 Some lower federal
courts have allowed plaintiffs to use the Act as a basis for private
civil suits challenging both the issuance and non-issuance of permits.1s1

1.

Challenges to Permit Issuance

The recent case of Potomac River Association v. Lundeberg
Maryland Seamanship School, Inc. 188 illustrates the form that challenges to permit issuance may take. Two citizens' organizations
brought suit against both federal and private defendants. The
Baltimore District of the Corps (the federal defendant) had issued
five permits, four of them before passage of NEPA, to Lundeberg
Maryland Seamanship School (the private defendant) for dredging
and filling in St. George's Creek.
The plaintiff sought, under NEPA, to require the Corps to complete an EIS for the one existing permit issued after NEP A's effective date, and for the still pending application for extension of one
of the pre-NEPA permits. The plaintiff also sought, under the
Rivers and Harbors Act, as complemented by NEPA and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), to prevent the Corps
from issuing the private defendants any further dredging or filling
permits.189 The federal district court for the District of Maryland, while recognizing that private plaintiffs may challenge the
prqcedures of the Corps, dismissed all claims against the federal
defendants. The plaintiffs' complaint regarding the preexisting
permits was held moot as all work under the permits was completed
and the permits had expired; the complaint concerning the pending permit extension was held within the primary jurisdiction of
the Corps and hence premature, because the Corps had not made a
final decision.190
The plaintiffs also asserted a cause of action under section IO of
the Rivers and Harbors Act both for damages against the private
186
187

422 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1975).
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 354 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But see,
e.g., Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (M.D.
Ala.), affd per curiam sub nom., Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d
1304 (5th Cir. 1971); Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp.
695 (D. Conn. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972).
188 402 F. Supp. 344 (D. Md. 1975).
189 Id. at 349-50.
190 Id. at 351.
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defendant for harm to the creek that had resulted in injury to the
plaintiffs and their members and for injunctive relief in the form
of restoration of the creek. The court denied the private defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the Rivers and Harbors Act
supported a cause of action by one private party against another
and that the plaintiffs' allegations of a maritime tort would serve
to provide admiralty jurisdiction.191 But the court went on to
hold that, under the Act, only activities that occurred outside the
permit and caused obstructions to navigation were actionable;
thus, the permit issued by the Corps was deemed to shield the
private defendant from liability for damages resulting from activities within the ambit of that permit.192
The Potomac River Association decision reflects the clear majority view that private plaintiffs have standing to bring civil suit
in federal courts when they allege violations of a federal regulatory
statute.193 The substantive rulings of the court. however, are puzzling. By limiting damages under the Rivers and Harbors Act to
losses occasioned by obstructions to navigation (and not, for
example, by damage to the environment) the court reimposed the
"navigational blinders" that the Fifth Circuit had attempted to
remove in Zabel v. Tabb. 194 Allowing a Corps permit to immunize
otherwise tortious activity is the consequence of viewing a generally
proforma procedure 195 as a decision based on "cost/benefit analysis of economic, historical and environmental and aesthetic factors." 196 It would seem better to view the permit for what it is
rather than for what it aspires to be.

2. Challenges to Permit Non-Issuance and Problems that Attend
Failure to Obtain a Permit
Recent complaints of disgruntled developers reflect a common
frustration. As the previous discussion illustrates, the program of
the Corps in administering section IO of the Rivers and Harbors
Act has been in flux during the last five years. Many aspects of the
191
102
193

Id. at 353-59.
Id. at 359.

See, e.g., Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 285 (1963).
194 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); see text accompanying
notes 131-32 supra.
195 See text accompanying note 261 infra.
196 402 F. Supp. at 355.
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program have undergone fundamental changes that present particular problems to those intending to engage in activities along
the coast. Investments are made, design specifications selected, and
costs calculated on the basis of what are thought to be existing
public regulations. Changes in either the regulations or the application thereof often undermine expectations.
To the extent that changes in the Corps' regulatory program
have been brought about through the enactment of new statutes
or the promulgation of new regulations, well developed procedures
exist for moderating the impact of the change on private expectations. Transitional provisions may phase in the new legislative
mandates; "grandfather clauses" may proscribe the application of
new rules to already accomplished projects. For example, some
new regulations have stipulated that a permit would not be necessary for certain type of work commenced or completed before the
regulations' effective date. 197 Other regulations have "phased in"
new constraints over a specified period.198
Many of the changes, however, have occurred in a less formal
fashion. In the exercise of their discretionary powers, District
Engineers are refusing to issue permits that they would have perfunctorily granted several years ago; 199 and courts have read new
meaning into pre-existing laws.20°Furthermore, the extent to which
a developer is protected in relying on an administrator's rule of
thumb or a judicial interpretation is problematic.201
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 209.150(b)(2) (1976) (work within established harbor lines) .
See, e.g., id. § 209.120(e) (2) (dredge and fill activities).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
200 See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971).
201 Of course, a developer may ignore the permit procedure altogether and proceed
with his activity-at the risk of discovery by the Corps and subsequent prosecution under
the Rivers and Harbors Act or the FWPCA. Should he be prosecuted, a developer may
argue that the Corps' authority is barred by equitable estoppel, !aches, or waiver. The
Supreme Court has ruled that, in some circumstances, an administrative agency may be
precluded from changing precipitously the official administrative construction of a
statute. In United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655- (1973), the
Court held that, in a criminal prosecution under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
for the discharge of refuse, the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the
defendant discharger was affirmatively misled by the Corps' past administrative practices.
Such evidence could create a defense if it deprived the accused of fair warning of what
conduct the government intended to make criminal. Id. at 670-76. This defense, however,
has thus far proved unsuccessful in prosecutions under the Act. See, e.g., Weiszmann v.
101

10s
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Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an unsuccessful applicant has standing to challenge a final agency decision. 202 But to
prevail the applicant must show that the administrative decision
was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with law." 203 Because the applicant is ordinarily
unable to show that there was no rational basis for denial of the
permit, he will instead try to establish that the procedure used
was not in "accordance with law." In recent cases, disappointed
developers have unsuccessfully attacked permit denials as unlawful on the following grounds: that the Secretary of the Army unlawfully delegated his statutory responsibility to the Chief of the
Corps of Engineers; 204 that the applicant received treatment unequal to that accorded other applicants; 205 that the Corps lacked
jurisdiction; 206 and that the Corps failed to prepare an EIS before
taking administrative action.207
Permit denials may also be challenged on constitutional grounds.
The fifth amendment imposes a fundamental limitation on the
power of the federal government by providing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.208
The question is whether a regulatory decision by the Corps to
District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates,
Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp.
42 (D. Hawaii 1976); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Ga. 1973);
United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1023 (D. Ore. 1973), aff'd in part, modified in part per curiam, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975). Despite
their dubious value as shields to prosecution, the doctrines of equitable estoppel, !aches,
and waiver might conceivably serve as a sword. In other words, a developer who either
proceeded without a permit or was denied a permit might bring suit seeking injunctive
relief and assert that the Corps, because it misled him, is barred or estopped fron exercising jurisdiction over his activity. The Fifth Circuit, however, has apparently rejected this
type of attack. See Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1976).
202 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1970).
203 Id. § 706(2)(A) (1970); see, e.g., Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. v. Hoffman, 526 F.2d 1311
(5th Cir. 1976); DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 984 (1974); Gables by the Sea, Inc. v. Lee, 365 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd per
curiam, 498 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
204 Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. v. Hoffman, 526 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) .
.205 Id.
206 United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976). But see
Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976).
207 United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Hawaii 1976).
208 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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deny a permit so interferes with the economic expectations of the
private landowner as to constitute a "taking." The answer has
almost uniformly been in the negative, largely because of the
operation of the commerce clause.209
The commerce clause was placed in the Constitution to nationalize interstate waterways and thereby assure the unimpeded flow
of maritime commerce.210 Accordingly, the Supreme Court, by
holding that the power to regulate navigation conferred on Congress by the commerce clause gives the federal government a "dominant servitude" or a "navigation servitude" to which the property
rights of riparian owners are subordinate, has given the Corps a free
hand in its efforts to improve navigation. Consequently, the federal
government is not constitutionally required to pay compensation
when it alters the course of navigable streams or otherwise impairs
a riparian owner's access to navigable waters, even if the market
value of the land is substantially diminished. In short, the riparian
owner cannot sue to enjoin the Corps from undertaking a civil
project even if no provisions for compensation have been made. 211
200 State constitutions, however, have proved to be more helpful to private land owners
challenging state statutes or agencies that restrict wetlands activities by riparian owners.
The results of judicial challenges to such statutes and administrative actions have been
mixed. Some have been held constitutional. See, e.g., Candlestick Prop., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. &: Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Potomac
Sand &: Gravel Co. v. Governor, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1040 (1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); cf. Turnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972) (flood zoning bylaw
upheld as within town's general zoning authority, therefore regulation not confiscatory),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). Others have been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dooley
v. Town Plan &: Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); State v. Johnson, 265
A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of ParsippanyTroy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); cf. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970) {preserving private land in natural state for
public benefit by preventing owner from using land for any practical purpose held not
within authority of zoning enabling act); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe &:
Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965) (whether there was taking without compensation
depends upon uses to which marshland can be put without violating prohibition against
filling); Sibson v. State, 110 N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969) (marshland on landward side of
salt meadow held not within purview of regulatory statute).
210 See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
211 See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900);
Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897). A number of commentators have examined
in detail the navigation servitude and the rule of no compensation discussed in these
cases. See Baldwin, The Impact of the Commerce Clause on the Riparian Rights Doctrine,
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When the Court made these decisions giving such broad powers
to the Corps, the Corps' single regulatory concern was the promotion of navigation. Recently, however, as noted above, the Corps
has been redirected to consider the full range of social, economic,
and environmental effects in pursuit of its programs. No longer
may the Corps focus solely on navigational problems.212 This
change in the emphasis of its coastal programs suggests new questions concerning the navigation servitude: for what purposes may
the navigation servitude be advanced, and to what geographical
area does the navigation servitude extend?
Because civil works projects of the Corps continue to be, at
least in part, for the purpose of maintaining and protecting navigation, Supreme Court authority would seem to imply that the
federal government, in condemning land or impairing riparian
rights, may still avail itself of the protection afforded by the navigation servitude.213 Today, however, because a permit may validly be
denied for ecological reasons (even though the project would not
impair navigation), the question arises whether the nagivation
servitude protects such an exercise of power from constitutional
challenge as a "taking" of property. In Zabel v. Tabb, the Fifth
Circuit dismissed the landowner's "taking" argument with passing
reference to navigation servitude, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.214 Hence, this constitutional question remains open.
Closely akin to the question of the effect of increased Corps
regulation unrelated to navigation is the question regarding the
geographical boundaries of the navigation servitude. As long as
the Corps exercised its regulatory powers with a view only towards
navigation, few questions arose as to the shoreward boundaries of
16 U. FLA. L. REv. 370 (1963); Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation Struggle for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1968); Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and
Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 325 (1969); Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The
Navigation Power and The Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. REsoURCES J. I (1963); Morris,
The Federal Navigation Servitude: Impediment to the Development of the Waterfront, 45
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 189 (1970); Stoebuck, Condemnation of Riparian Rights, A Species of
Taking Without Touching, 30 LA. L. REv. 394 (1970); Comment, Navigational Servitude as
a Method of Ecological Protection, 75 DICK. L. REv. 256 (1971).
212 See text accompanying notes 124-41 supra.
213 See Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
214 430 F.2d at 215 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). The Fifth Circuit
held that the waters and underlying land at issue were subject to the paramount servitude
in the federal government that the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1970),
expressly reserved. The court declined to discuss the constitutional issue.
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federal jurisdiction. Now that the Corps is concerned with environmental protection of coastlands as well as with navigable waters,
however, the shoreward boundaries have assumed added significance. Supreme Court cases make clear that the boundaries of the
navigation servitude are not coextensive with the overall area
that the Corps may legitimately affect in the execution of its delegated powers under the commerce clause. For example, in United
States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,215 a Corps' dam on a
navigable river backed water up a non-navigable tributary, thereby
destroying the agricultural value of plaintiff's land. The Court
found the project a permissible exercise of commerce powers, but
required payment of compensation because the private property
damaged was above the ordinary high water mark. 216 Likewise, in
United States v. Rands,217 the Court observed that the navigation
servitude does not extend beyond the ordinary high water mark,
although, of course, the servitude's existence did reduce the value
of riparian land above that line.218
Citing Rands and Kansas City, therefore, a developer of coastal
activities to whom the Corps has denied a permit might argue that
the Corps' assertion of power over such activities is, in effect, a
confiscatory taking of property. However, in two recent cases, this
argument was rejected without rigorous analysis of either the substantive limits or the geographic perimeters of the navigation
servitude.219
339 U.S. 799 (1950).
Id. at 800-01.
217 389 U.S. 121 (1967). This case provoked a response from Congress in the form of section Ill of the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-611, 84
Stat. 1821 (codified in 33 U.S.C. § 595 (a) (1970)). Section 111 makes no effort to change
the geographical boundaries of the navigation servitude, but does change the measure of
compensation to the abutting landowner. The significant portion reads as follows:
In all cases where real property shall be taken by the United States for the
public use in connection with any improvement of rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways of the United States, and in all condemnation proceedings by the United
States to acquire lands or easements for such improvements, the compensation
to be paid for real property taken by the United States above the normal high
water mark of navigable waters of the United States shall be the fair market
value of such real property based upon all uses to which such real property may
reasonably be put, including its highest and best use, any of which uses may be
dependent upon access to or utilization of such navigable waters.
218 389 U.S. at 123.
219 United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975) ; United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Ga. 1973). But see United
215

216
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One final problem with respect to private rights occurs when
a developer who has failed either to seek or obtain a permit
from the Corps goes ahead with the proposed project. In such
situations, the Corps will sometimes attempt to assert its jurisdiction over what may be a completed capital improvement.
The problem is a by-product of the Supreme Court dogma: "When
once found to be navigable, a waterway remains so." 220 If literally
applied to the Corps' regulatory program, this dictum would produce anomalous results-Corps jurisdiction would extend to thousands of acres of streets, home sites, factory sites, and railyards that
were once rivers, canals, and tidal marsh. Instead, several federal
courts, in the interests of fairness, have refused to permit after-thefact application of the Corps regulatory program to sites that were
developed on the reasonable supposition that permission was not
required. 221 In several cases where the developer had completed a
fill without a permit, courts, rather than requiring total restoration, have ordered development of less costly compromise solutions
that consider financial feasibility and environmental advisability.222
Similarly, courts have also refrained from making officers of corporate developers personally liable for the cost of restoration. 223 In
short, courts have exercised discretion in these situations to
"temper ... the law with a touch of equity." 224
The foregoing discussion describes the various challenges that
private parties can institute to the Corps' regulation program.
Obstacles to attack on the issuance of permits are primarily jurisdictional, but the consensus seems to be that private parties may
States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408° F. Supp. 42 (D. Hawaii 1976), which created a "special exception" for Hawaii because of the special manner in which Hawaii became a U.S. territory.
220 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940) (footnote
omitted). See generally text accompanying notes 81-89 supra.
221 See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) (.solid
upland that had been marsh prior to 1927), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Sierra Club v.
Leslie Salt Co., 412 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (diked evaporation ponds used for salt
production); James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth.,
359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.) (parking lot that had been site of a canal prior to 1880), affd,
481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975);
United States v. American Capital Land, 8 E.R.C. 1654 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
223 United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
224 United States v. Sunset Cove Inc., 514 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975).
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use the courts to question the legality of issued permits. The extent
to which private parties may recover civil damages in tort from
permit holders is more uncertain, however, especially in view of
the Potomac River Association holding that a permit ordinarily
shields its holder from tort liability. Attacking a permit denial has
proved more difficult because of the procedural protection given
administrative decisions, but the courts have shown some concern
for the special difficulties applicants have had in anticipating the
Corps' increasingly stringent constraints.
!IL

APPRAISAL OF THE CORPS' REGULATORY PROGRAM

The regulatory program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is
in a state of flux. Historically, the Corps has served as a permissive
port warden. Today, however, it resolves disputes concerning development along the margins of major and minor waterways. This
section will appraise the success with which the Corps is handling
its present regulatory responsibilities and venture some opinions
regarding its capacity to assume a broader role.

A.

Jurisdiction

Concern with the extent of the Corps' regulatory authority is a
recent, but active, topic of legal concern. Traditionally, the question answered itself. Because the Corps' concern was with keeping
maritime channels open, its subject matter jurisdiction extended
to obstructions thereto. Likewise, because the Corps' concern had
a geographic situs, its territorial jurisdiction was defined in terms
of locality-within "navigable waters."
Only since the Corps first evidenced concern for a broader array
of values in the late 1960's has precise delineation of the boundaries of "navigable waters" become significant. Developers in marginal areas have sought to avoid rigorous environmental review by
establishing that their projects are not within the ambit of the
Corps' regulatory powers. This argument is particularly attractive
for use in court, because there is no procedural presumption that
the Corps' determination of its jurisdiction-over changing sidelines of tidal water, for example-is correct.
As a result, determining the geographical boundaries of navigable waters has been the most litigated issue under the Rivers and
Harbors Act. This development is unfortunate for two reasons.
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First, it sometimes renders application of the Corps' regulatory
powers dependent upon esoteric and quixotic factors such as 200year-old tidal data, the routes used by nineteenth century traders,
or the identity of the actor (Mother Nature or Brother Developer)
who unplugged the canal. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the inquiry generally has little to do with the goals of the Corps'
regulatory pi:ogram-moderation of water-related activities and
projects so as to promote the public interest.
Congress is now again faced with the question of determining the
extent of the Corps' dredge and fill authority under section 404
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Several alternative
systems are available: the maritime transport system (as indicated
by commercial utilization), major waterways (as indicated by
flowage), or all surface waters (as measured hydrologically).225 But
when it chooses among these alternatives, Congress should not define the Corps' area of concern in terms of locality or territory. To
do so would make major policy decisions turn on legalistically
attributed differences in extensional meaning between terms such
as "navigable waters," "navigable waters of the United States," and
"water of the United States." 226 Not only are such distinctions
mind-boggling, they may also have perverse consequences.
The Supreme Court faced analogous problems in Executive Jet
Aviation Inc. v. City of Cleveland. 221 There the question was
whether federal admiralty jurisdiction existed over aviation tort
claims arising from the crash of a charter flight in Lake Erie. Rejecting the traditional "locality" test of admiralty jurisdiction, the
Court instead considered whether the accident in question had a
significant relationship to maritime activity and determined that
there was no such relationship. 228
Congress should adopt the approach of Executive Jet Aviation
in specifying the Corps' jurisdiction. First, Congress should choose
the "system" that it desires the Corps to regulate; the Corps' licen225 Several bills were introduced in the 95th Congress during January, 1977, that
would amend the Corps' authority under section 404. See 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1445 (Jan.
28, 1977).
226 For a discussion of the definition of "navigable waters," see Environmental Protection
Agency Memorandum to Regional Offices on the Meaning of the Term "Navigable.
Waters", reprinted in ENvm. L. REP. (ELI) 46316 (STATUTF.S AND REGULATIONS) (June 7,
1973).
221 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
22s Id. at 268-71.
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sing authority should then extend to projects and activities that
relate significantly to that system. Such an approach to defining
the Corps' jurisdiction has several advantages. It would both avoid
the semantic confusion and possible perversity of results in a locality definition of jurisdiction and rationalize the Corps' jurisdictional inquiry. Under this proposed system, the Corps would
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a particular activity
according to the purpose of the permit program and the likely impact of the project or activity.

B.

Decision Criteria and Procedures

In the past, a broad consensus supported the Corps in its pursuit
of one narrow objective, the promotion of navigation. Shipping
interests, cities, unions, and taxpayers supported port development
and considered side effects unimportant. Today's laws and regulations, however, call upon the Corps to receive, one by one, proposals for waterfront development; to evaluate the environmental,
economic, and social ramifications of each; and then to authorize,
reject, or modify each proposal, depending upon whether it is in
the "public interest." Because of the lack of consensus regarding
what constitutes the "public interest," execution by the Corps of
its statutory mandates, once fairly simple, has become frightfully
difficult.
Assessment of the Corps' response necessarily begins with an
inquiry into the concept of the public interest. Political scientist
Glendon Schubert divides the contemporary theories of the public
interest into three groups: idealist, rationalist, and realist.229
Under the idealist theory, the true public interest rests in a
higher, natural law, a law that obtains regardless of the wishes of
the people. Idealists describe the public interest as a thing of substance separate and apart from the administrative process. The
job of the administrator is to resist political influence and to impose
on the people what is good for them, whether they want it or not.230
On questions of coastal utilization, disciples of the idealist
theory abound. They argue that the natural law is the law of na229 Schubert, Is There a Public Interest Theory?, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 162, 164 &: n.2
(C. Friedrich ed. 1962). Schubert based his classifications on the system developed by W .A.
Leys in Ethics and Administrative Discretion, 3 PUB. AI,. REv. 10, 18-22 (1943).
230 Schubert, supra note 229, at 166-67.
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ture; accordingly, any alteration of the coastal ecosystem should
be forbidden. Idealists also demand that wetlands be protected
because they are ecologically productive. The Corps, however, has
resisted these blandishments. Instead, it has listened to congressmen, politicians, other government agencies, special interest
groups, and concerned citizens. It has rejected mechanistic rules
that would preserve all tidal marshes and require that all coastal
facilities be water dependent. 231 In short, the District Engineers of
the Corps have refused to behave as idealistic social engineers.
Rationalist theory rejects the idealist notion that the public
interest is a thing of substance independent of private interests.
Accordingly, rationalists postulate a common good that reflects the
presumed existence of various common (often majoritarian) interests. This common good finds expression in the will of the
people. Hence, rationalist theory charges the decisionmaker with
faithfully implementing that popular will. 232
The complications implicit in this theory as applied to the program of the Corps are illustrated by a permit application considered by the Baltimore District Office of the Corps between 1972
and 1974.233 The Maryland Port Administration sought permission
to construct a marine terminal complex in Baltimore Harbor.
From the state's economic vantage, determination that such a facility would be in the public interest seemed elementary in that the
Port of Baltimore generates about twelve percent of the Gross
Maryland Product. But from the perspective of the city, the question was less clear; lost real property tax revenues resulting from
the Port Administration's ownership might exceed the indirect
revenues to the city attributable to the proposed complex.234 There
was no clearly defined "common good" or "popular will" that the
Corps could follow. Other examples illustrating the inapplicability
of rationalist theory to the Corps are not hard to find. In Florida
Audubon Society v. Callaway, 235 various "public interest groups"
found themselves at cross-purposes. An environmental group found
itself pitted against civil rights groups and an energy development
See text accompanying notes 137-41 supra.
Schubert, supra note 229, at 164-65.
233 See Case Study of a Corps of Engineers Permit Application: NABOP-P (Md. Port
Administration), 20 CHESAPEAKE R.EsEARCH CONSORTIUM PUBI.ICATION (Mar. 1976).
234 Id. at 16 & n.l.
235 6 E.R.C. 1320 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
231

232
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firm. Hence, the Corps was faced, not with a popular will to
execute, but with an intense conflict of "interests" among its various "publics" with regard to how the coast should be used.
Rationalists respond to this type of problem by asserting that
the proper function of the bureauracy is to carry out the policy
norms promulgated by Congress and the President. Administrators,
according to rationalist theory, prescribe rules to carry out norms
that only representatives of the people, who reflect the popular
will, can make. Scientific management, cost-benefit analysis, or
most recently, environmental impact assessment are means by
which administrators allegedly will be kept subservient to the
"will of the people." 236
The success of such rationalist procedures has been criticized
widely. For example, political theorist Edwin T. Haefele points
out that cost-benefit analyses generally fail to include the full
range of technical possibilities and are tempered by what the administrators judge to be political reality. Administrators attempt
to assess the public interest and make social choices hidden behind
inadequate cost-benefit analyses. 237 Haefele emphasizes that decisions with respect to environmental quality involve "social or
collective" choices and he therefore questions the capacity of administrators to gauge the public interest:
For when true social choices are at stake, nothing less than legislatures [using technical and administrative advisory committees] making these choices will suffice in our system of representative government. The spectacle of executive personnel attempting to assess the
public interest through public hearings or to divine appropriate
actions through committees "representing" all interests from housewives to steel mills is an outrage in the pure sense-it does violence
to our system of govemment. 2 38

Libertarian economist Richard A. Posner voices a somewhat
different criticism of administrative decisionmaking. He observes
that one of the original rationales for the creation of administrative
agencies was that "by delegation to an appointive agency certain
highly charged problems could be taken out of politics and resolved
Schubert, supra note 229, ,at 165-66.
Haefele, Environmental Quality as a Problem of Social Choice, in
QUALITY ANALYSIS 281, 284 (A. Kneese & B. Bower eds. 1972).
238 Id. at 285.
236
237
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in accordance with neutral criteria, such as efficiency." 239 He decides, however, that in terms of actual effect, resources are more
likely to be allocated efficiently without regulation. 240
Applying either Haefele's or Posner's criticisms, the Corps' regulatory program fails to measure up to the goal of rationalist decisionmaking. Haefele seems correct in his charge that District Engineers are required to make social choices unrelated to their expertise and without quantification of the values involved. Choices
regarding the preferred level of population density and environmental quality, the cost and allocation of tax burden for public
services, and who enjoys the benefits of coastal resources, inhere in
the Corps' decisions-yet the rationalist theory assumes that Congress or the President will make many of these decisions. The
Corps' regulatory scheme also is vulnerable to Posner's criticism.
By allowing political and special interests into its decisionmaking
process and often acceding to their preferences, the Corps has
attempted to accommodate preferences rather than to ensure the
most efficient resource use.
Curiously, while Haefele and Posner would agree that the Corps'
regulation "politicizes" decisions as to how coastal resources are
to be used, they suggest antithetical responses. Haefele, reflecting
the rationalist view, suggests that, faced now with value conflicts
that call for social choices, we create new, more representative,
legislative bodies for making the choices.241 Posner, on the other
hand, believes that the route to more efficient use of resources is
deregulation because the market is a more efficient mechanism
for valuing competing uses than is the law. 242 Hence, Haefele
would try to force environmental issues into politics while Posner
would try to rid environmental issues of politics.
Realist theorists would reject the solutions of Haefele and Posner. Instead, they would lower expectations regarding what the
Corps' procedures are expected to accomplish. Realists, like the
rationalists, recognize that the public interest is a collection of
239 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 387 (1973).
240 Id. at 329. In fact, P~sner argues that perhaps the real reason for delegation of
congressional power to administrative agencies, rather than to the courts, was to assure
a more sympathetic enforcement of congressional policies not motivated by efficiency concerns. Id. at 387.
241 See Haefele, supra note 237, at 285.
242 See R. POSNER, supra note 239, at 323.
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selfish interests, but reject the notion that the administrative process has the capacity to calculate the best, socially preferred, or most
efficient use of resources. Instead, decisionmakers are called upon to
mediate conflicts respecting the use of resources. 243 This is precisely
the role that the Corps has undertaken.
Rather than attempt to calculate or to represent the public
interest, the Corps has set itself up as a mediator. Its regulations
direct the District Engineers to consider and weigh conservation,
economics, aesthetics, history, navigation, water quality, and environmental values. Because it knows the difficulty of attempting to
reflect all of these values, the Corps circulates permit applications
among various other concerned federal, state, and local agencies.
This procedure, by injecting a healthy eclecticism into the review
procedure, is the major strength in the present regulatory process.
Various reviewers look at the permit request from different perspectives and, accordingly, with different emphases: local governments-land use; state natural resource agencies-water quality and
wetlands preservation; state economic development agencies-port
development; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service-fish and wildlife
values; the Environmental Protection Agency-environmental
quality. Notice and hearing procedures allow citizens' groups and
other special interest groups to espouse their viewpoints. While it
supervises this review and considers the input, the Corps also
conducts its own appraisal of navigation values, its traditional area
of expertise. No single agency has either the expertise or procedures necessary to consider these diffuse and sometimes conflicting
interests as effectively as does the Corps.
Special procedures have also been developed to allow partisan
political reconciliation of significant issues. By agreement, if a
District Engineer and the local representative of the LT .S. Fish and
Wildlife Service disagree, the dispute is shipped to Washington
for political resolution at the Secretarial level. By regulation, if an
application proves "controversial," an Environmental Impact
Statement must be prepared. Although the EIS may be a post hoc
rationalization for a decision already made, its preparation allows
opponents of the decision time to organize and provides them with
a written record with which to take issue.
The realist view of the Corps' process unabashedly dodges the
243

See Schubert, supra note 229, at 164.
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criticisms of Haefele and Posner. Realists do not guarantee Haefele
that any particular administrative decision will be "right," but
they assert that decisions that are the product of a process of full
consideration are more likely to be in the public interest. The
essence of the Posner thesis, as applied to the Corps' regulatory
program, is that the market would allocate waterfront resources
more efficiently without the Corps' licensing requirements. But
this proposition, even if correct, fails to prove that "no regulation"
is socially preferable to "regulation." The notion of "efficiency"
sounds, but really is not, value neutral; efficiency merely expresses
the best utilization of resources in terms of the willingness of
people to pay. There are many ways of expressing collective preferences regarding the "right" allocation of resources. Congress's
perpetuation of the Corps' regulatory program can be viewed as
a social choice in favor of a decision process that will take into
account the preferences of those unable to advocate their value
assertions with money.
Accepting these lowered realist expectations, outstanding weaknesses nevertheless remain in the Corps' regulatory process. One
problem is that the Corps' procedures, superimposed on state and
local regulations, create a layer cake of sometimes redundant review. Although there are advantages in the review of activities
from the special perspectives of various agencies at various levels
of government, duplicative procedures and processing waste both
money and time. A solution already authorized, but not yet implemented, is to allow the district offices of the Corps to enter into
agreements that provide for joint processing and evaluation with
state or local governments with overlapping permit programs.244
Another problem is the narrow focus and ad hoc, disjointed
nature of the Corps' licensing determinations. This fragmentation
of decisionmaking creates both the possibility of overlooking cumulative effects and the tendency to ignore some of the higher order
questions.
The problem of cumulative impact is well illustrated by a 1973
permit application considered by the Baltimore District Office of
the Corps.245 The application in question was for the construction
33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (f) (3) (v) (1976).
See Power, Watergate Village: A Case Study of a Permit Application for a Marina
Submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2 COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT J. 103
(1975).
244
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of thirty additional boat slips at Watergate Village, an apartment
complex on a cove of Back Creek within the city limits of Annapolis, Maryland. By itself, the project seemed virtually harmless. No
marsh would undergo dredging or filling, and the resulting structure would neither obstruct navigation, impair the waterscape,
nor have a deleterious impact on water quality. Yet, when viewed
as one increment to the overall development of Back Creek,
the effects of environmental perturbation became significant. First,
if the number of boats moored in Back Creek continued to proliferate, the Creek would become overcrowded. Lost time costs
would be imposed on the boaters, safety hazards would increase,
and, in general, the quality of the recreational experience would
diminish. Moreover, an increase in private mooring slips, by effectively foreclosing construction of a planned public facility, would
work at cross-purposes to provision of "public access" to Back
Creek. Finally, the increase in boat traffic that the proposed facility
would cause would contribute to a readily foreseeable degradation
of water quality in Back Creek. The Corps' regulations direct the
District Engineer to consider cumulative impacts of proposed activities,246 but considering that this application was but one of approximately 1,450 received by the Baltimore District Office during
1973,247 it is not surprising that cumulative effects are sometimes
overlooked.
The Corps' ad hoc licensing process also may overlook underlying social choices. The decisionmaker may not see the forest for
the trees. For example, in the Watergate Village case, the District
Engineer initially focused upon the impact of the project on a
fringing marsh and on water quality in the immediate vicinity,248
but not upon the development plan for the watershed. Unless the
Corps determines the permissible density of development and the
location and construction of public facilities (public marinas and
sewers, for example), making rational decisions regarding the
watershed's assimilative capacity either for additional wastes or for
additional boats is impossible.249
Again, existing Corps procedures provide at least a partial solution. District offices of the Corps have been understandably disin246
247
248
249

33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (f) (2) (iv) (1976) •
See Power, supra note 245, at 120.
See id. at 105-06.
Id. at 121.
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dined to prepare Environmental Impact Statements for single permit applications because of the high monetary and time costs that
preparation of an EIS incurs.250 This approach is well-advised,
because the suggested range of environmental impacts is too narrow, the number of applications too great, costs too high, and the
delays too long to justify preparation of an EIS for each permit.
The EIS format, however, may be helpful in responding to some
of the aforementioned problems. Instead of preparing an EIS for
a single permit, the Corps could develop one EIS for geographic
areas of recurrent problem topics. For example, the Baltimore
District of the Corps commissioned an environmental assessment
of the cumulative effects of development on the entire Annapolis,
Maryland region after the Watergate Village Case Study alerted
the District to the crowding and water quality problems that were
developing in that area. 251 Interestingly, in order to avoid the procedural rigmarole necessarily concomitant to preparation of an
EIS, the Corps chose to characterize this detailed study as an "assessment" rather than as an Environmental Impact Statement. Similar
studies might be commissioned to delve into such generic problems
as shore erosion control practices. The Corps' regulations already
suggest such "umbrella" uses of the EIS. 252 Such practices, however,
could be vulnerable to judicial challenge, as many federal courts
strictly enforce the EIS requirement. 253
The Corps' regulatory process creates one major problem for
which there is no ready or foreseeable solution. The procedures
are well designed to allow the Corps to pick out and arrest projects
that public agencies or significant private interest groups consider
contrary to the public interest; but the procedures are not well
designed to approve projects that, on balance, are in the public
interest, but involve significant social costs and engender substantial opposition. Although Corps procedures do provide a
mechanism through which projects or activities can be approved
250
251

See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
See UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT,

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL

(1975). At
the time of the assessment, 12 permit applications for various projects within the area
had been submitted to the District for processing. Id. at 1-1.
252 33 C.F.R. § 209.410 (e) (7) (v) (1976) .
. 253 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971). But see Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975).

ASSESSMENT: PROPOSED PROJECTS ON SPA AND BACK CREEKS, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
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over outstanding opposition, the District Engineer may not issue a
permit if any certification required by federal, state, or local law is
denied. 254 Furthermore, if the District Engineer believes granting
the permit may be warranted but that the proposed activity would
have a significant environmental impact, he must prepare, coordinate, and file an EIS prior to final action. 255 District Engineers may
issue permits only where there are no knO"wn or unsatisfactorily
resolved substantive objections,256 and Division Engineers may
sometimes override objections of other federal agencies. 257 Applicants have an opportunity to rebut objections,258 but ordinarily, if
there is unresolved conflict with a federal agency, the permit may
only issue from the Chief of Engineers or the Secretary of the
Army.250
The dynamics of this process are illustrated by the Corps' decision to deny the Deltona Corporation permission to develop 1,900
acres of mangrove swamp on Florida's Marco Island. The overall
project originated in 1964 and called for development of a "new
town" of about 35,000 population. The Corps routinely granted
permits in 1964 and 1967, but warned the developer in 1969 that
permit procedures were being tightened. In 1975, the developer
entered into an agreement with the Governor of Florida whereby,
in return for issuance of the various state permits, the developer
agreed to give the state various segments of mangrove wetlands.
The developer then filed with the Corps applications for three fill
permits covering a total of over 2,000 acres. The District Engineer
recommended disapproval of two applications and approval of the
third, which covered only 113 acres, subject to various special conditions. DOI and EPA concurred with the District Engineer, but
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) held out for disapproval of all three applications. Despite
NOAA's opposition, the Chief of Engineers approved the District
Engineer's decision. 260
254
255
256
257
258
259
200

C.F.R. § 209.120(£)(3) (1976).
§ 209.120(i)(l)(iv).
§ 209.120(p)(l).
§ 209.120(p)(2)(i).
§ 209.120(i)(l)(iii).
§ 209.120(p)(2)(ii).
See 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2141-43 (Apr. 23, 1976).

33
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This decision, assuming it withstands administrative and judicial
review, will have dramatic consequences. It demonstrates that the
Corps' permit procedures are better designed to veto projects than
to expedite them. The basic job of some EPA, DOI, and NOAA
administrators is to point out the potential perturbations that
coastal projects present to water quality, fish and wildlife, or wetlands. District offices of the Corps serve as clearinghouses for these
opinions and encourage compromise of differences. Developers
who want to engage in a large scale project may be able to work
out a proposal that state and local officials feel, on balance, to be
in the public interest. For example, state and local officials may
determine that the social benefits of a project (jobs created during
the construction stage; resulting increases in the real property tax
base; value of sewers, roads, and water systems that the developer
provides) outweigh the social costs (incremental community services required; perturbations to natural systems). The Corps, however, may avoid the onus of reviewing the accuracy of this costbenefit analysis and the wrath of environmental groups by deferring to EPA, DOI, and NOAA officials who, having little interest
or stake in the benefits of a project, remain adamant in their objections. The Corps' procedure, in short, has become largely pro
forma. With limited staff and funding, the Corps can only process
applications, circulate them to other agencies for comments, and
approve applications to which no government agency objects.261
The Corps is a mediator in the sense that it solicits views from all
interested parties, but its "mediation" consists of disapproving any
project opposed by government agencies. Thus, it is surprising that
Congressman Charles E. Grassley expressed utter amazement, during debates on the Corps' jurisdiction in 1976, that "all the environmental groups are willing to let the Army Corps of Engineers exercise such broad powers under . . . [its regulatory program] and at other times and other places want to restrict the
authority of the Army Corps because of the ecological damage the
corps does or might do." 262 The answer is clear: the Corps' permit
program is institutionally designed to block or scale down projects,
not to encourage them.
261
262

See Power, supra note 245, at 120.
122 CONG. REc. H5276 (daily ed. June 3, 1976).
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Private Rights

The current land use reform literature focuses on the limitations
on governmental power imposed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.263 The conventional wisdom is that
these anachronistic constitutional constraints present a major impediment to the capacity of government to assure that land is used
in the public interest. This indictment seems faulty on all counts.
The "taking" problem is not a product of an obsolete and obscure bit of excess constitutional verbiage, but rather a manifestation of a legitimate concern. In situations where the "taking" clause
does not strictly apply, some courts have reinvented it in the form
of variations on common law principles of estoppel and laches. 264
There are good arguments in terms of both fairness and economics
for protecting those who make significant capital investments in
reliance on established governmental policy; 265 to do so is not to
favor the "private" interest or the "public" interest, but to pay
deference to one particular public interest: a concern for the responsible economic expectations of private parties. The Marco
Island case, discussed above, 266 illustrates this point well. As a result
of the decision to preserve 1,900 acres of wetlands, building lots
having an estimated value of between fifty and eighty million
dollars were not created. The conventional view of environmentalists and, apparently, many land use reformers is that this decision
results in an unalloyed public benefit. The loss of between fifty and
eighty million dollars, suffered either by the developer or purchasers, is considered to be a purely private loss. It is more realistic,
of course, to view the issue in terms of the trade-offs involved.
Regulators should keep lost opportunity costs in mind when
making decisions. Welfare economics literature has emphasized
the importance of making firms "internalize" all costs associated
with their activities in order to assure that they will consider all
costs and benefits associated with external effects of a proposed
activity and thus make "efficient" decisions regarding the produc263 See e.g., F. BoSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); THE USE
OF LAND: A CmZENS POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (W. Reilly, ed. 1973).
264 See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
265 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Comj,ensation" Law, 80 HAR\'. L. REV. Il65 (1967).
266 See text accompanying note 260 suj,ra.
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tion of goods and services. 267 The standard example is that of a
factory discharging smoke. Were the factory required to pay all of
the "social costs" associated with the discharge, the market mechanism itself would guarantee the appropriate level of production and
the appropriate level of smoke abatement-or, at least, so goes the
rudimentary analysis. 268 But most economists would admit that, because "transaction costs" often impede the ability of the free market
to reach efficient results, some governmental regulation is justified.
Similarly, when regulation does occur, it would seem equally important that the ·governmental entity internalize the cost of its
regulations. Otherwise, government will tend to be excessive in
imposing constraints.269
Of course, this analysis proves too much. The legal system lacks
the sophistication to force cost internalization; firms and governmental entities respond to different incentives, a firm being more
motivated by profit maximization. Yet this analysis does go a long
way toward legitimizing a governmental concern for lost private
value. If the agency ignores some of the costs imposed by the imposition of regulations, its judgment is biased. The Constitution
and the quasi-estoppel notions developed by some courts are means
to ensure governmental awareness.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is no longer a permissive
port warden. In response to goads from Congress and the courts,
the Corps has constructed a regulatory program well designed to
preserve wetlands and other natural systems in the coastal region.
Now pending in Congress is the question of the Corps' jurisdiction upland and upstream. In resolving this issue, Congress must
understand the true nature of the Corps' regulatory program. The
program does not work as a sophisticated moderator of coastal
development that makes refined cost-benefit calculations in order:
to ascertain the "public interest" and then promotes good projects
and activities while squelching bad ones. Such a role is far beyond
the program's capacity; technical analysis can make the decisionSee, e.g., o. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT 8-9 (1965).
See Coase, The Probl~m of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
269 See E. RABIN, TEACHERS MANUAL FOR FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW
264-65 (1974).
267

268
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maker better informed, but the "public interest" can be calculated
only by a politically responsive and representative political bodywhich the Corps is not.
The Corps' program discourages coastal development. It provides a forum for the adjustment of minor conflicts concerning
coastal use, but in the event of unrelenting opposition to a project
by either a governmental agency or a credible environmental
group, it tends to block the project. Once the nemesis of the environmentalists, the Corps is now their hero. In the words of Senator Edmund Muskie: "[We] have put the fox in the chicken coop
[and it has] become a chicken .... " 210

210

Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 67.

HeinOnline -- 63 Va. L. Rev.

559 1977

HeinOnline -- 63 Va. L. Rev.

560 1977

